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In Olive v. Commissioner, the U.S. Tax Court applied § 280E of the 
Internal Revenue Code (“Code”) promulgated by Congress to enact a public 
policy penalizing those who sell illegal drugs to deny Olive’s trade or 
business deductions associated with selling medical marijuana.1 To solve 
Olive’s tax problem, Professor Leff proposes Olive form a tax-exempt social 
welfare organization, hire the unemployed and the unemployable, and train 
them to sell marijuana.2 This would seemingly enable Olive to avoid the 
strictures of § 280E3 since the Code generally does not impose taxes on tax-
 
               Assistant Professor of Law, Louisiana State University Law Center. I thank Ellen Aprill, 
Adam Chodorow, John Colombo, Benjamin Moses Leff, Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer, Edward Richards, 
Stephen Schwarz, and Donald Tobin for their comments on this essay. I particularly thank my 
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 1. Olive v. Comm’r, 139 T.C. 19 (2012).  
 2. Benjamin Moses Leff, Tax Planning for Marijuana Dealers, 99 IOWA L. REV. 523 (2014). 
 3. Id. 
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exempt social welfare organizations.4 Leff unconvincingly supports his case 
by arguing no public policy doctrine applies to social welfare organizations, 
and further, that we should look to local law rather than federal in 
determining social welfare.5 But this seems hollow. The Controlled 
Substances Act (“CSA”) makes illegal the activities of both such a proposed 
organization and all the individuals who participate in the manufacture or 
distribution of marijuana within such an organization.6 It would be odd 
indeed if such a criminal organization could obtain significant public 
benefits via the Code. 
While Professor Leff’s efforts to resolve this tax problem are well taken, 
his proposal is unrealistic and ultimately it does not work.7 It is clear, and 
Leff concedes, that Olive could not operate as a tax exempt charitable 
organization under § 501(c)(3) because of the “public policy doctrine,” 
which prohibits a charitable organization from violating any law or 
established public policy.8 What is slightly less clear, however, is Leff’s 
unique claim that a § 501(c)(4) social welfare organization not only need 
not concern itself with this same public policy doctrine, but also may ignore 
federal criminal law and look to local law in defining social welfare.9 I 
contend that the public policy doctrine should apply with equal force to 
social welfare organizations and charitable organizations, as these 
organizations are merely kissing cousins without significant structural 
differences.10 Furthermore, I contend a federal tax exempt organization may 
not choose to ignore federal criminal law. Leff’s suggestion that local law, 
instead of federal law, applies to regulations that direct a social welfare 
organization to promote the social welfare of the people of the community 
misunderstands the meaning of the regulation. The purpose of community 
 
 4. I.R.C. § 501(a) (2012) provides that organizations described in I.R.C. § 501(c) are 
exempt from federal income tax. 
 5. Leff, supra note 2; see also Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 598 (1983). 
 6. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 841, 844 (2012). 
 7. I confine myself to tax law here. There are substantial criminal law concerns as well as 
legitimate professional licensing considerations that anyone who chooses to form or operate 
such an entity should consider before entering into any such transaction. See Robert E. Mikos, A 
Critical Approach to the Department of Justice’s New Approach to Medical Marijuana, 22 STAN L. & 
POL’Y REV. 633, 649 (2011) (discussing the significant issue of whether the individuals of such 
an enterprise could be prosecuted under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization 
(RICO) statute). I also choose not to engage the substantial problem that any organization that 
chooses this path would face in convincing the IRS that its operation is not simply an artifice for 
“carrying on a business with the general public in a manner similar to organizations which are 
operated for profit.” See Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(4)-1(a)(2)(ii) (as amended in 1990). 
 8. Leff, supra note 2; see Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 598 (1983). 
 9. Leff, supra note 2. 
 10. There is controversy regarding the precise boundaries of the public policy doctrine. 
See, e.g., Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 609–10 (Powell, J., concurring) (noting the importance of 
pluralism in tax-exempt organizations); see also Johnny Rex Buckles, Reforming the Public Policy 
Doctrine, 53 U. KAN. L. REV. 397 (2005). 
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is to direct the organization to be a community movement rather than a 
private one; it is not intended to allow an organization to define away federal 
limitations on what is and is not the promotion of social welfare. 
Additionally, Leff’s solution is harmful to the law regarding social 
welfare organizations, an ill-defined category that is difficult for the Internal 
Revenue Service (“IRS”) to monitor even without Leff’s proposal.11 As Leff 
notes, the IRS and practitioners have long used social welfare to silo 
nonprofit organizations that are publically beneficial, at least in someone’s 
mind, but not beneficial enough for charitable status.12 Fitting certain illegal 
actions into that silo is more of the same. This strategy stretches the law and 
the resources of our government every time some new organization looks to 
tax exemption to solve its new “important” problem that is unrelated to tax 
law. I argue that those who believe marijuana should be legal should expend 
effort to change federal marijuana policies instead. 
In this Essay, I first discuss the requirements of § 501(c)(4) to 
demonstrate that an organization with a purpose to violate federal criminal 
law does not fit within its borders. I then consider illegality under the Code 
along with the public policy doctrine as it applies to tax-exempt 
organizations. Finally, I consider the implications of this analysis and address 
whether these implications are supported by the prevailing theories on why 
we provide tax-exempt status. Thereafter, I conclude that Leff’s proposal is 
unrealistic and should be rejected. 
I. SECTION 501(C)(4)’S TAX-EXEMPT STATUS IS INAPPLICABLE TO 
ORGANIZATIONS THAT PROMOTE ILLICIT ACTIVITY 
A thorough analysis of § 501 contradicts Leff’s claim that tax-exempt 
status may apply to social welfare organizations promoting illicit activity. 
Section 501 provides that “[c]ivic leagues or organizations not organized for 
profit but operated exclusively for the promotion of social welfare” qualify 
for exemption from federal income tax.13 Although there is no legislative 
history regarding this statutory language,14 an examination of the 
 
 11. Just consider the IRS Tea Party “scandal” as an example of the harm that comes from 
such an ill-defined Code section made more ill defined by the effort to fit into its ambit 
whatever organization needs a tax-exempt solution of the day. See TREASURY INSPECTOR 
GENERAL FOR TAX ADMINISTRATION, INAPPROPRIATE CRITERIA WERE USED TO IDENTIFY TAX-
EXEMPT APPLICATIONS FOR REVIEW, (May 14, 2013), available at 
http://www.treasury.gov/tigta/auditreports/2013reports/ 
201310053fr.pdf (discussing the role a lack of guidance played in the IRS’s inappropriate 
target of certain organizations). 
 12. See, e.g., FRANCES R. HILL & DOUGLAS M. MANCINO, TAXATION OF EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS 
¶ 13.01 (2012). 
 13. I.R.C. § 501(a), (c)(4)(A) (2006). 
 14. This provision likely originates from a Chamber of Commerce request to exempt “civic 
and commercial” organizations. See Hearings on Tariff Schedules of the Revenue Act of 1913 Before the 
Subcomm. of the Comm. on Finance, 63d Cong., 1st Sess. 2001 (1913) (statement of United States 
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organizations labeled as “civic” associations or organizations at the time of 
the statutes passage in 1913 suggests the boundaries Congress envisioned. A 
cursory consideration of the organizations15 suggests it is highly unlikely 
Congress intended social welfare organizations could adopt as a purpose the 
violation of federal or state criminal laws. 
Examination of the § 501 regulations supports this conclusion. The 
regulations provide that “[a]n organization is operated exclusively for the 
promotion of social welfare if it is primarily engaged in promoting in some 
way the common good and general welfare of the people of the 
community.”16 Organizations qualifying include homeowner’s associations 
(as long as the facilities are generally open to the public),17 health 
maintenance organizations,18 cause-related organizations, organizations 
engaged in community beautification,19 and organizations involved in 
providing transportation in a community.20 Notably, there are no readily 
identifiable social welfare organizations whose purpose involves breaking the 
law. 
Leff tries to pivot off the phrase “people of the community” from the 
social welfare organization regulations to suggest there might be some 
ability to judge social welfare from a local perspective and ignore federal 
criminal law. However, the phrase “people of the community” suggests an 
idea similar to that played by the charitable class with respect to charitable 
organizations. This means a social welfare organization must be operated for 
 
Chamber of Commerce). “Commercial” organizations, the Chamber said, are not “selfish,” but 
perform “civic functions,” and work to improve commerce in the interest of all citizens. The 
argument follows as such: civic and commercial organizations should not be taxed for the same 
reason charities should not be taxed—they provide a public benefit in return for exemption. 
 15. The American Civic Association’s 1911 convention notes, for instance, state that its 
attendees came from all parts of the country seeking to achieve “the idea ‘practical,’ in making 
beautiful and efficient community life.” Am. Civic Ass’n’s Convention, Notes, 2 ART & PROGRESS 
117, 117 (1911). It recognized various other kindred civic leagues like “the National Municipal 
League, the General Federation of Women’s Clubs, the Rochester City Planning Conference, . . 
. the American Federation of Arts, ‘Boston, 1915,’ and the National Plant, Flower and Fruit 
Guild.” Id. The National Municipal League of the time mentioned by the American Civic 
Association was described by its secretary, as “an active agency in the betterment of American 
municipal administration.” Clinton Rogers Woodruff, The National Municipal League, 5 PROC. 
AM. POL. SCI. ASS’N 131, 131 (1908). The League believed it was only through “united action 
and organization that good citizens can secure the adoption of good laws and the selection of 
men of trained ability and proved integrity for all municipal positions or prevent the success of 
incompetent or corrupt candidates for public office.” Id. at 132. 
 16. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(4)-1(a)(2)(i) (as amended in 1990). 
 17. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 74-99, 1974-1 C.B. 131. 
 18. Cf. Vision Serv. Plan, Inc. v. United States, 265 F. App’x 650 (9th Cir. 2008) 
(unpublished opinion). See also INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL 4.76.31.1, available at   
www.irs.gov/irm/part4/irm_04-076-031.html (setting forth its procedures for determining 
whether a health maintenance organization qualifies under I.R.C. § 501(a) & (c)(4) (2006)). 
 19. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 75-286, 175-2 C.B. 210. 
 20. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 78-69, 1978-1 C.B. 156. 
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more people than a select few. As one court said, such an “organization must 
be a community movement designed to accomplish community ends.”21 
There is nothing to support Leff’s contention that the term “community” 
within a social welfare context means a particular community may ignore 
some federal laws in defining social welfare. It merely connotes that there 
must be a “community” big enough to accept that this organization has a 
real public purpose. 
A social welfare organization must operate “exclusively” to promote 
social welfare. While this would seem to suggest that any scintilla of a non-
social welfare purpose would be deadly to qualification, the Treasury 
Regulations concerning § 501(c)(4) interpret exclusively to mean 
“primarily.”22 This interpretation, although long-held, is in significant 
dispute23 and conflicts with the Supreme Court’s interpretation of 
“exclusively” in Better Business Bureau of Washington, D.C., Inc. v. United States, 
in which the Court analyzed the term in the context of the Social Security 
Act.24 The Court stated the term “exclusively . . . . plainly means that the 
presence of a single noneducational purpose, if substantial in nature, will 
destroy the exemption regardless of the number or importance of truly 
educational purposes.”25 
The Treasury Regulations regarding § 501(c)(3) also interpret 
exclusively to mean primarily, but state no “more than an insubstantial part 
of [an organization’s] activities” may be in furtherance of a non-exempt 
purpose.26 Additionally, while the regulations provide an organization 
cannot operate for the “primary purpose” of running an unrelated trade or 
business, it again uses the substantial language to modify “primary”;27 in the 
positive, the regulation states an organization can operate “a trade or 
business as a substantial part of its activities, if” that business furthers the 
organization’s exempt purpose.28 This caveat in the § 501(c)(3) regulations 
seems truer to a likely intent of Congress in using the term “exclusively.”29 
 
 21. Erie Endowment v. United States, 316 F.2d 151, 156 (3d Cir. 1963). 
 22. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(4)-1(a)(2) (as amended in 1990). 
 23. See, e.g., Letter from Fred Wertheimer, President, Democracy 21, to Douglas H. Shulman, 
Comm’r, Internal Revenue Serv. (July 27, 2011), available at http://www.democracy21.org/ 
uploads/D21_and_CLC_Petition_to_IRS_7_27_2011.pdf  (requesting the IRS change its regulation 
to eliminate the term “primarily” in those regulations and suggesting the standard should be a 
question of substantiality instead). 
 24. Better Bus. Bureau of Wash., D.C., Inc., v. United States, 326 U.S. 279 (1945). 
 25. Id. at 283 (emphasis added). 
 26. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(1) (as amended in 2008). 
 27. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(e). 
 28. Id. (emphasis added). 
 29. Some argue that the enactment of the unrelated business income tax prompted a 
changing of the “exclusively” language, such that the use of the term “primarily” is likely the 
correct standard. See, e.g., Ellen P. Aprill, The IRS’s Tea Party Tax Row: How ‘Exclusively’ Became 
‘Primarily,’ PAC. STANDARD (Jun. 7, 2013), http://www.psmag.com/politics/the-irss-tea-party-
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It is hard to believe Congress meant one thing regarding the word 
“exclusively” with respect to charitable organizations and another with 
respect to social welfare organizations. In fact, courts reviewing social 
welfare as a purpose have generally used the substantial notion of exclusivity. 
In Contracting Plumbers for instance, the Second Circuit, considering whether 
an organization qualified under § 501(c)(4) stated: “we adhere to the rule 
that the presence of a single substantial non-exempt purpose precludes 
exempt status regardless of the number or importance of the exempt 
purposes.”30 I submit that this continues to be the correct standard, and 
since illegal actions cannot promote a social welfare purpose, the only real 
question left is whether Congress intended social welfare organizations to be 
able to violate federal law if local law conflicted. As noted above, this seems 
highly suspect. 
In conclusion, the difference in purpose between charitable 
organizations and social welfare organizations is slight.31 The biggest 
difference is that a social welfare organization can engage in some political 
campaign intervention, while a charitable organization cannot.32 It is hard, 
though, to find a significant difference between the two that would suggest 
one could violate the law to some different extent. Should the greater 
subsidization of a charitable organization really mean a social welfare 
organization could choose to ignore federal criminal law? I think not. 
II. TAXPAYERS MAY NOT USE THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE TO PROMOTE 
ILLICIT ACTIVITY 
Leff’s proposal is subject to two slightly different public policy 
doctrines, both of which will likely disallow his suggestion. The courts 
developed the first public policy doctrine on the idea that the federal tax 
system has no role in sanctioning criminal activity.33 Courts often deny 
business deductions for expenses that contravene “sharply defined” public 
 
tax-row-how-exclusively-became-primarily-59451/. However, Congress did not change the term 
“exclusively” in either §501(c)(3) or (4). It also maintains the use of the notion of “substantial” 
adopted by the Court in Better Business. Better Bus. Bureau of Wash., D.C., Inc., 326 U.S. at 283. 
 30. Contracting Plumbers Coop. Restoration Corp. v. United States, 488 F.2d 684, 686 
(2d Cir. 1973). 
 31. A social welfare organization can engage in one-hundred percent lobbying while a 
charitable organization can engage in no more than a substantial part. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) 
(2006). The regulations under §501(c)(3) indicate that “social welfare” qualifies as a charitable 
purpose. See id. There is no “organizational” test that applies to social welfare organizations, 
while such a test applies to charitable organizations. Both organizations are subjected to § 4958 
excess benefit transactions and there is a prohibition on inurement for both, as well as a 
prohibition on private benefit, and “commercial activity.” Charitable organizations of course 
may receive deductible charitable contributions, while social welfare organizations may not. 
 32. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) expressly prohibits the participation in, or intervention in “any 
political campaign on behalf of (or in opposition to) any candidate for public office.” 
 33. Comm’r v. Tellier, 383 U.S. 687, 691 (1966); see also Edward J. Roche, Jr., Federal 
Income Taxation of Medical Marijuana Businesses, 66 TAX LAW. 429 (2013). 
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policy.34 “[T]he test of nondeductibility always is the severity and immediacy 
of the frustration resulting from allowance of the deduction.”35 Seeing the 
merits in this doctrine, Congress codified a similar approach in several areas 
of the Code. For instance, the Code now prohibits deductions for illegal 
bribes, kickbacks, or illegal payment under the law, or for any fine paid to a 
government for violation of the law.36 
Both of these public policy doctrines are alive and well. For instance, 
the Tax Court denied a loss deduction for a man who burned his house 
down in a grossly negligent manner.37 Congress also continues to use public 
policy to deny deductions. It in fact enacted § 280E on public policy 
grounds.38 Accordingly, the public policy doctrine likely affects Leff’s 
proposal—the question, however, is how? 
A. THE APPLICATION OF THE PUBLIC POLICY DOCTRINE TO CHARITABLE 
ORGANIZATIONS 
If the Code is not generally intended as punishment, how should the 
public policy doctrine apply in the case of organizations exempted from 
income tax? The predominant view of tax exemption is that it is a subsidy.39 
If exemption is a subsidy, by choosing to grant an organization exemption, 
the federal government is aiding that organization’s activities and 
purposes—clearly, the federal government did not intend for the Code to 
promote illicit activities. 
In Bob Jones, the Court held an organization that violates established 
public policy is not tax exempt under § 501(c)(3).40 Bob Jones argued that 
even though it employed racially discriminatory policies it satisfied the 
“educational” purpose of § 501(c)(3) and did not need to show it qualified 
as “charitable” too.41 It claimed that while the word “charitable” might 
include a public policy requirement from charitable trust law, no such idea 
is imbued in the purpose of education.42 The Court, believing the plain 
purpose of the statute could not possibly allow the violation of law or 
 
 34. See Tank Truck Rentals, Inc. v. Comm’r, 356 U.S. 30, 33 (1958). This typically applied 
to criminal fines where a court believed the allowance of the deduction worked against state 
systems of criminal enforcement. 
 35. Id. at 35. 
 36. I.R.C. § 162(c), (f). 
 37. Blackman v. Comm’r, 88 T.C. 677, 682 (1987). 
 38. In recommending it, the Senate Finance committee stated: “[t]here is a sharply 
defined public policy against drug dealing.” S. REP. NO. 97-494, vol. 1, at 309 (1982). 
 39. See generally Philip T. Hackney, What We Talk About When We Talk About Tax Exemption, 
33 VA. TAX REV. 101 (forthcoming 2014).  
 40. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 591–92 (1983). 
 41. Id. at 585–86. 
 42. See id. 
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established public policy, looked beyond the plain language of the statute.43 
Because tax-exempt organizations must provide a public benefit in return 
for their tax-advantaged status, the Court held such organizations must not 
violate public policy.44 
While Leff is correct that the Court focused upon charitable trust law to 
justify the public policy doctrine as to charitable organizations, I contend 
the Court’s reasoning is expansive and rests within the broader public policy 
doctrine discussed above that applies throughout the Code. Speaking at 
once regarding the concept of “charity” but at the same time speaking to the 
idea of “tax exemption”—a broader concept—the Court stated Congress 
had “the intent that entitlement to tax exemption depends on meeting 
certain common-law standards of charity—namely, that an institution 
seeking tax-exempt status must serve a public purpose and not be contrary 
to established public policy.”45 In a footnote, the Court drew support from 
the public policy doctrine regarding deductions discussed above.46 
Recognizing the broad application of the public policy doctrine in the Code 
by courts and Congress, the Court could have decided Bob Jones without 
resorting to charitable trust law. The requirement that an organization 
receiving tax exempt-status may not violate established public policy is 
simply a logical step that comes with the granting of such federal benefits. 
Tax-exempt organizations should not be allowed to violate fundamental 
public policy.47 
Also, Bob Jones did not violate criminal law, it violated a significant 
national moral code prohibiting discrimination on the basis of race. If Bob 
Jones violated criminal laws (other than say, parking tickets), the case likely 
never would have reached the Supreme Court. Importantly, none of the 
justices (including the dissent) had trouble with the IRS legitimately denying 
tax-exempt status to Fagin’s School for Educating English Boys because its 
primary purpose—to teach people to violate the law—is simply not 
charitable or educational within the meaning of the statute. No one needed 
charitable trust law to come to such a conclusion—such a notion must be 
within the statute itself. 
 
 43. Id. at 586; see also id. at 591–92 n.18 (“Fagin’s school for educating English boys in the 
art of picking pockets would be an ‘educational’ institution under that definition. . . . Surely 
Congress had no thought of affording such an unthinking, wooden meaning to § 170 and § 
501(c)(3) as to provide tax benefits to ’educational’ organizations that do not serve a public, 
charitable purpose.”). 
 44. Id. at 592. 
 45. Id. at 575. 
 46. Id. at 591 n.17 (discussing “the presumption against congressional intent to 
encourage violation of declared public policy” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 
Tank Truck Rentals, Inc. v. Comm’r, 356 U.S. 30, 35 (1958))). 
 47. Cf. supra notes 7–10 (discussing the controversy regarding applying the idea of 
“fundamental public policy”). 
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B. TAX EXEMPT ENTITIES MAY NOT USE ILLEGAL ACTIVITIES TO PROMOTE THEIR 
EXEMPT PURPOSE 
Leff’s claim that social welfare organizations may take illegal actions to 
support their tax-exempt purpose is simply inaccurate. As a preliminary 
matter, the IRS holds social welfare organizations may not violate the law.48 
The IRS explains that “[i]llegal activities, which violate the minimum 
standards of acceptable conduct necessary to the preservation of an orderly 
society, are contrary to the common good and the general welfare of the 
people in a community and thus are not permissible means of promoting 
the social welfare.”49 
Leff suggests, however, that this holding is not necessarily controlling 
because the IRS apparently has a different policy for social welfare 
organizations than charitable organizations.50 This argument is unpersuasive 
because the IRS found the same quantum of illegal activity meant this 
organization was not operated exclusively for an exempt purpose as either a 
charitable or a social welfare organization. Although certain illegal actions, 
like violations of local pollution regulations, may not deny an organization 
exempt status, other illegal activities, like robbing banks, will immediately 
result in an organization’s loss of exempt status.51 
The question then arises as to whether promoting illegal marijuana 
sales and/or consumption is sufficiently “illegal” to result in the loss of 
exempt status. The following two judicial opinions indicate the answer is 
clearly yes. 
In United States v. Omaha Live Stock Traders Exchange, the Eighth Circuit 
determined a livestock trading exchange organization could qualify as a 
business league under § 501(c)(6) even though it engaged in illegal trade 
practices; the organization otherwise qualified, and the illegal practices did 
no harm to business practices.52 The later clarified antitrust violations of 
business leagues only become problematic when the practice is: 
(1) judicially determined to violate the law; (2) a principal practice or one 
of a number of principal practices; (3) harmful to general business; and 
(4) imputable to the members of the organization.53 This simply implements 
the idea that the tax-exemption question is whether the legal violation is too 
great in quantity and quality that it overshadows the exempt activity. 
 
 48. Rev. Rul. 75-384, 1975-2 C.B. 204; see also Jean Wright & Jay H. Rotz, Illegality and 
Public Policy Considerations, in EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS CONTINUING PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION 
(CPE) TECHNICAL INSTRUCTION PROGRAM FOR FISCAL YEAR 1994 (1993), available at 
www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/eotopicL94.pdf. 
 49. Rev. Rul. 75-384, 1975-2 C.B. 204. 
 50. Leff, supra note 2. 
 51. I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 34,631, at *12–13 (Oct. 4, 1971). 
 52. United States v. Omaha Live Stock Traders Exch., 366 F.2d 749, 751–53 (8th Cir. 1966). 
 53. I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 37,111 (May 4, 1977). 
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The U.S. Tax Court adopted a similar line of reasoning in determining 
that an organization qualified as a social club under § 501(c)(7) even 
though it engaged in illegal gambling.54 There were a couple of mollifying 
factors though—all the clubs in the area engaged in such gambling activity 
under the knowledge of the law, and revenues from the activity made up a 
small portion of the revenues of the club in the relevant years (twenty-two 
percent and thirteen percent).55 Following this case, the IRS ruled a social 
club deriving revenue from illegal gambling devices still qualified as exempt 
as a social club under § 501(c)(7).56 Troublingly, the IRS found gambling 
devices promoted pleasure and recreation.57 While the court case seems 
justifiable under my above analysis, the related IRS ruling seems incorrect 
and of questionable merit. It is very odd for the federal government to assist 
an organization in explicit violation of state or local statutes.58 
The IRS position today, as evidenced by a recent private letter ruling, 
seems to be that illegality does not foster any exempt purpose. As Leff notes, 
the IRS ruled a cooperative with a primary purpose of the cultivation of 
marijuana for sale could not qualify as exempt under § 501(c)(16).59 
Because the sale of marijuana is illegal under federal law—and federal law 
prevails over state law—the IRS found the organization did not qualify for 
exemption. It based its holding on the principle that tax deductions and 
exemptions are not available to those who violate the law. 
III. PROFESSOR LEFF’S OLIVE BRANCH FAILS BECAUSE IT DIRECTLY AND 
SUBSTANTIALLY CONFLICTS WITH CONTROLLING FEDERAL LAW 
Leff’s suggested course of action contradicts the decision by all three 
branches of the federal government that marijuana should be illegal. 
Congress enacted legislation to make marijuana illegal, and on public policy 
reasons, Congress denies marijuana dealers trade or business deductions 
under the Code. Federal law bans people who use illicit drugs from: serving 
in a certain roles associated with public transportation,60 receiving federal 
housing assistance,61 and possessing firearms.62 The Court has found the 
criminalization of marijuana to be constitutional.63 The Department of 
 
 54. Aviation Country Club, Inc. v. Comm’r, 21 T.C. 807, 815–17 (1954). acq., 1954-2 C.B. 3. 
 55. Aviation Country Club, Inc., 21 T.C. at 813–15. 
 56. Rev. Rul. 69-68, 1969-1 C.B. 153. 
 57. Cf. Augusta Golf Ass’n, Inc. v. United States, 338 F. Supp. 272, 275 (S.D. Ga. 1971). 
 58. Congress enacted I.R.C. § 501(i) in 1976 to make explicit that social clubs may not 
discriminate in their written organization documents on the basis of race, color, or religion. 
This legislation of course predates the Bob Jones opinion.  
 59. I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2013-33-014 (May 20, 2013); Leff, supra note 2.  
 60. 49 U.S.C. § 5331 (2006 & Supp. V 2011). 
 61. 42 U.S.C. § 13661 (2006 & Supp. V 2011). 
 62. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3) (2012). 
 63. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005); United States v. Oakland Cannabis 
Buyers’ Coop., 532 U.S. 483 (2001). 
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Justice (“DOJ”) states in considering enforcement regarding marijuana it 
takes into consideration that “marijuana is a dangerous drug and that the 
illegal distribution and sale of marijuana is a serious crime that provides a 
significant source of revenue to large-scale criminal enterprises, gangs, and 
cartels.” 64 Engaging in the distribution of such a drug that is a clear public 
policy problem at a federal level cannot possibly promote social welfare. 
The attempt to stretch the idea of community in the idea of social 
welfare to allow a community to ignore certain federal laws also fails; the 
idea of community focuses on whether there is a big enough group to make 
an activity a public one. Thus, nothing suggests a tax-exempt social welfare 
organization could take up as a purpose the sale of marijuana. Considering 
the gravity of such an offense, any adoption of such a purpose should also 
automatically rise to the level of a substantial purpose and deny such an 
organization social welfare status. This analysis is no different than would 
apply to a charitable organization, whether called the public policy doctrine 
or the illegality doctrine. 
In the spirit of not just offering criticism, but also offering a solution, I 
recommend considering that in the case of conflict with criminal law at the 
state and federal level, the better course of action might be for the state or 
local government to take that activity on itself. Admittedly, others have 
already pointed out that the state itself is not allowed to violate the CSA.65 
However it would seem in the case of medical marijuana, instead of placing 
the battle between relatively unaccountable private entities and the federal 
government, the state, through its traditional function of operating hospitals 
and clinics, should open up medical marijuana clinics or provide medical 
marijuana services through state hospitals. State and local governments are 
exempt from tax in most circumstances,66 and the state can provide more 
accountability to its community, the federal government, and other states. 
This is a much better solution than trying to expand an abused section of 
the Code. Such a solution would also be more consistent with accomplishing 
the objectives of the DOJ that it described in its recent memo regarding 
enforcement of marijuana laws in states that have legalized medical 
marijuana.67 
 
 64. See Memorandum from James M. Cole, Deputy Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to 
all U.S. Attorneys 1 (Aug. 29, 2013), available at www.justice.gov/iso/opa/resources/3052 
013829132756857467.pdf.  
 65. Mikos, supra note 7, at 659. 
 66. Because of space in this Essay, I do not discuss the tax status of state and local 
government entities. See, however, a good discussion of the tax status of such entities in Ellen P. 
Aprill, Excluding the Income of State and Local Governments: The Need for Congressional Action, 26 GA. 
L. REV. 421 (1992). 
 67. See Memorandum from James M. Cole, supra note 64.  
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IV. IMPLICATIONS OF THEORIES OF RATIONALE FOR EXEMPTION 
It is worth considering the prevailing rationales for exemption to check 
my foregoing analysis. Two prominent theories suggest tax exemption can 
help solve inefficiencies of government failure68 and market failure.69 
Government failure arises because government typically only provides the 
public goods needed by the median voter—i.e., representatives can be 
expected to provide what the median voter wants rather than what the voters 
on either extreme want. Therefore, some significant set of citizens is denied 
an optimal amount of public goods. Nonprofits can provide some of those 
desired public goods. Market failure arises as a result of free rider problems 
and asymmetrical information. Nonprofits provide a more trustworthy 
organization than for-profit businesses to provide services and goods 
associated with market failure. We subsidize the nonprofit sector because of 
the necessary challenges with such organizations raising enough capital to 
provide the optimal amount of these services. 
So, does a market failure or government failure exist in the sale of 
medical marijuana? If there is no market failure, there is no reason to 
believe there is a government failure. Government failure should only arise 
in association with public goods, and the lack of a market failure is a big 
indicator that there is no public good involved. Given that many 
organizations are willing to sell medical marijuana in a for-profit manner 
when the product is illegal, it is hard to conclude market failure exists. This 
makes a claim of government failure highly dubious. Thus, neither of the 
two prominent theories regarding tax exemption supports tax exemption in 
the case of the illegal sale of marijuana. 
Finally, in considering why we provide exemption, we should also ask 
upon what basis we would tax nonprofit corporate entities in the first 
place.70 Our rationale for imposing a tax should have implications for why 
we might decide not to tax. There appear to be two primary reasons we 
might tax nonprofit entities: (1) to tax shareholders and (2) to regulate 
corporate managers. It is hard to find how the organization that Leff wants 
to establish might involve shareholders. However, I contend that setting 
clean boundaries for tax-exempt organizations, such as prohibiting them 
from violating the law, makes the question of whether there are 
shareholders much easier to determine. It is an administratively useful tool 
in this endeavor. Those who would violate the law will likely not be acting in 
 
 68. Burton A. Weisbrod, Toward a Theory of the Voluntary Nonprofit Sector in a Three-Sector 
Economy, in THE ECONOMICS OF NONPROFIT INSTITUTIONS: STUDIES IN STRUCTURE AND POLICY 
21–26 (Susan Rose-Ackerman ed., 1986). 
 69. Henry Hansmann, The Rationale for Exempting Nonprofit Organizations from Corporate 
Income Taxation, 91 YALE L.J. 54, 67–68 (1981). 
 70. Hackney, supra note 39.  
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a public capacity—i.e., such individuals are more likely to control the 
organization to deliver its surplus to private interests rather than public. 
Analyzing the question from the perspective that the tax is a regulatory 
device—i.e., we should apply a separate tax on entities where there is a 
separation of ownership and control, in order to take some of the power 
away from the corporate managers—also suggests there should be a tax on 
an organization engaged in illegal activities. Particularly considering the fact 
that Congress has chosen to regulate sales of marijuana via the Code 
through § 280E, it would seem entirely appropriate to utilize a tax in the 
corporate context as well as a regulatory device to regulate managers who 
plan to violate local, state, or federal law. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Professor Leff’s efforts at solving this tax challenge and conflict between 
federal and state law are noble, but run headlong into creating more 
problems by his effort to pigeonhole the latest problem of the country into a 
tax-exempt entity. These efforts cause harm to tax-exempt law by stretching 
its bounds too far. Although there is almost no legislative history suggesting 
what Congress might have meant by a civic league promoting social welfare, 
there is certainly no evidence that it intended such organizations to be able 
to violate federal law. Everything indicates Congress generally saw these 
organizations as receiving a subsidy in exchange for doing something that 
provided a public benefit. It makes no sense to say Congress would intend to 
provide such a subsidy to an organization specifically intending to violate a 
federal law that is relatively long-held and supported by precedent. Sorry 
Olive, but Professor Leff’s “branch” cannot save you this time. 
 
